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COMMENT
CURBING PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES
I.

INTRODUCTION

A peremptory challenge is a challenge exercised by an attor
ney to exclude a potential juror from the jury panel. There is no
requirement that the attorney explain or justify a peremptory chal
lenge, and no judicial determination is made as to its validity or
sufficiency.1 Due to the discretionary nature of the peremptory
challenge, it has been the subject of much abuse by prosecutors
desiring to secure a potentially "conviction-biased" jury panel. 2
Prosecutors have employed the peremptory challenge as a device
to exclude members of a cognizable societal group3 from a petit
jury solely on the basis of that group membership. In particular,
prosecutors have sought to eliminate those individuals with the
1. A challenge for cause, unlike a peremptory challenge, requires the attorney
to give a specific reason, within statutory guidelines, for excluding a potential juror.
The challenge is subject to judicial approval. Typically, statutes providing grounds
for removal for cause permit exclusion of a juror who is related to a party to the liti
gation, who has special knowledge of or previous participation in the case, or whose
state of mind would prevent impartial action. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§
1071-1076 (West 1970); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1971). In con
trast, a peremptory challenge, often referred to as a peremptory, requires no justifica
tion or judicial approval prior to its use. Except for statutory limitations on the num
ber of peremptories, the exercise is essentially uncontrolled. In Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Supreme Court characterized peremptory challenges as
those exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control." Id. at 220.
2. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 902 (1978). For a discussion of some of the cases where prosecutors have pur
posefully excluded prospective jurors in hopes of securing "conviction-biased" ju
ries, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 152-59 (1977). Van Dyke notes
that "[pjeremptories have been subject to abuse from the time juries were first intro
duced in England." Id. at 147.
3. Essentially, a cognizable group is one readily identifiable and infused with a
distinct set of attitudes and beliefs arising from a common perspective and life expe
rience. For example, blacks are considered a cognizable group. See text accompa
nying notes 64-69 infra for a discussion of standards for identifying a cognizable
group.
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same group affiliation as the defendant. 4 The motivation for such
prosecutorial discrimination is the belief that jurors of the same
group as the defendant will be biased in favor of acquittal. 5 The re
sult is a jury panel which is often decidedly more homogeneous
than the community at large. 6
This comment will examine the scope of the peremptory chal
lenge in criminal trials, the deliberate use of peremptory chal
lenges in a discriminatory manner, and the existing and potential
remedies for such abuse. The United States Supreme Court's long
standing approach, set forth in Swain v. Alabama,7 will be dis
cussed. The emerging alternatives to Swain, successfully utilized
by defendants in state courts, then will be considered. 8 Finally,
the potential impact of these alternatives on future attempts to in
validate juries selected through the discretionary exercise of per
emptory challenges will be explored.
It will be shown that defendants in most of the United States
presently have little hope of establishing a prima facie case of dis
criminatory prosecutorial action in the exercise of peremptory chal
lenges in any given case. This comment will suggest approaches
which a defendant may successfully employ to assert a denial of his
rights by a prosecutor who exercises the challenges granted to him
against all, or almost all, members of a particular cognizable group.
By following one of the approaches set forth in this comment,
hopefully defendants will be able to better protect their rights to a
fair trial by an impartial jury composed of a representative cross
section of the community, unhampered by prosecutorial discrimi
nation.
4. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 155-56. It is important to note that the defendant
need not be of the same group affiliation as the jurors peremptorily challenged to as
sert a claim of violation of constitutional rights. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972),
the Supreme Court held that a white defendant had standing to assert his claim
where no blacks had served on the grand jury that indicted him or on the petit jury
that convicted him. Id. at 504-05. The Court stated: "[W]hen a grand or petit jury has
been selected on an impermissible basis, the existence of a constitutional'violation
does not depend upon the circumstances of the person making the claim." Id. at 498.
5. United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); J. VAN DYKE,
supra note 2, at 152-54.
6. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 902 (1978).
7. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
8. In particular, the decisions that will be discussed are: People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751
(La. 1979); State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d
1071 (La. 1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In England, prior to 1305, the peremptory challenge was
available to both the Crown and the defendant. 9 The Ordinance of
Inquests, passed in that year, forbade the use of peremptories by
the Crown because the previous grant of unlimited challenges had
caused infinite delay.lO From this point on, criminal defendants
were entitled to exercise a limited number of peremptory chal
lenges whereas the government was allowed only challenges for
cause.ll The rationale for providing the defendants with "an arbi
trary and capricious species of challenge . . . without showing any
cause at all"12 was to protect the defendant 13 from jurors prej
udiced either by the defense's inciteful questioning on voir dire14
or by an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the juror for cause. IS
No similar protection was available to the government because
none was thought necessary.
It was not until the nineteenth century that the government's
interest in obtaining an impartial jury was recognized. 16 A certain
number of peremptory challenges were allocated to enable the gov
ernment to strike jurors who were unfairly biased against convic
tion.1 7
The development of the peremptory challenge in the United
States paralleled the common-law development of the challenge.
The First Congress followed the common-law practice of providing
defendants alone with the right to exercise peremptory challenges
to potential jurors. IS It was not until 1865 that the government was
9. 33 Edw. I, Stat. 4 (1305).
10. Id.
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353.
12. Id.
13. Blackstone refers to the peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that
tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous."
Id. at 346.
14. Id. at 353. Blackstone explained that
sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive
upon the bare looks and gestures of another ... [and] the law wills not that
[the defendant] should be tried by anyone man against whom he has con
ceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a reason for such his
dislike.
Id.
15. Id.
16. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 150.
17. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 621, 387 N.E.2d 499,
513, cen. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
18. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (current version at FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(b».
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granted the right to exercise peremptory challenges in federal
courtS. 19 The practice in state courts varied. 20 For example, New
York did not allow the prosecutor to exercise any peremptory chal
lenges until 1881. 21 Virginia did not grant prosecutors the right to
exercise peremptories until 1919. 22 Today, however, the peremp
tory challenge is provided for by statute throughout the United
States. 23 It is available to both parties in the jury selection pro
ceeding although the exact method of application varies by stat
ute. 24
III.

SCOPE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Although not constitutionally mandated,25 the peremptory
challenge has long been recognized as an essential component of
the right to a fair trial by jury.26 Peremptories provide a mecha
nism for assuring the existence of an impartial jury in a given trial.
It is hoped that both sides will exercise their peremptory chal
lenges judiciously to eliminate the extremes of partiality and poten
tial prejudice. The result is a jury composed of "impartial" commu
nity members.27
Despite the benefits to be derived from the exercise of per

19. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500 (current version at FED. R.
CRlM. P. 24(b».
20. See]. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171-72 n.57, for a compilation of the
dates when each state authorized the prosecutor to exercise peremptory challenges.
21. Id. at 171 n.46. See also People v. Aichinson, 7 How. Pro 241 (N.Y. 1852).
22. ]. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 171 n.46.
23. See, e.g., FED. R. CRlM. P. 24(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1970);
N.Y. CRlM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1971).
24. There are basically two methods by which challenges are exercised. Under
the system most commonly used, prospective jurors are chosen from the venire and
are then subject to challenges. Once a juror is peremptorily challenged, he is re
placed by another prospective juror. The replacement is then subject to peremptory
challenge if the attorney has additional challenges remaining. The struck jury system
is an alternative approach used in some states. Its exact method of application varies.
Generally, the attorneys exercise their challenges for cause first to achieve a venire
the size of the final jury plus the number of peremptory challenges available to both
sides. At this point, each side exercises its peremptories until the panel is down to
the final size. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146-47. The struck system is recognized
as more manipulative since the attorneys have more of an opportunity to control the
composition of the final panel. It was the struck system that was utilized in Alabama
and upheld as nondiscriminatory in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 218.
25. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
26. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
27. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 219; People V. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274,
583 P.2d 748, 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901 (1978).
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emptory challenges by both sides, peremptories also may be a tool
for invidious discrimination by the prosecutor. By exercising his
peremptory challenges to exclude all prospective jurors of a partic
ular racial or ethnic group, the prosecutor can produce a jury panel
that is not only demographically unbalanced,28 but is arguably
more biased than the randomly selected jury panel. 29 In doing so,
the prosecutor may be infringing upon the defendant's constitu
tional protections of equal protection and fair trial by an impartial
jury.
IV.

THE SWAIN LEGACY

In Swain v. Alabama,30 the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to ex
clude from the jury those black jurors remaining after challenges
for cause were exercised. 31 The Court created a presumption that
the prosecutor was using his peremptory challenges in a permissi
ble manner to secure a fair and impartial jury in any given case. 32
The Court went on to say, "The presumption is not overcome ...
by [defendant's] allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because
they were Negroes."33
28. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276, 583 P.2d 748, 761, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 902 (1978).
29. ld.
30. 380 U.S. at 202. In Swain, the black defendant challenged the prosecutor's ex
ercise of his peremptories against every black venireman as violative of the defend
ant's right to equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment: the exact
·number so challenged was unclear. It should be noted that the sixth amendment
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury had not yet been applied to the states.
Whether the United States Supreme Court would have decided Swain differently
had the sixth amendment been applicable is open to debate. In People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978), the California Supreme
Court suggested that the United States Supreme Court would have reached the same
result. The California court perceived the underlying motivation for the Swain deci
sion, preservation of the arbitrary nature of the peremptory system, to be equally ap
plicable to the two constitutional provisions. ld. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 908. This notion may be supported by the language of Swain. The United
States Supreme Court stated: "[T1o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particu
lar case to the demands of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change
in the natur~ and operation of the challenge." 380 U.S. at 221-22. The same objec
tion, the California court argued, would presumably arise if the sixth amendment
were invoked. 22 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
31. 380 U.S. at 227.
32. ld. at 222. The Swain Court reviewed the history of peremptory challenges
in England and the United States and then concluded that the use of peremptories
in a given case must remain unquestionable. ld. at 212-22.
33. ld. at 222.
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The Court proceeded to set forth the burden a defendant
would have to meet in order to establish a prima facie case of dis
crimination. Essentially, the Swain standard gives presumptive
propriety to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a
given case. 34 The defendant has the burden of establishing that the
prosecutor has acted deliberately and systematically, in all types of
cases, over an extended period of time, to exclude all members of
a particular racial or ethnic group from all jury panels in the coun
ty so that no members of the group ever serve on petit juries. 35 If
the defendant meets this burden, then Swain suggests that the
presumption would be overcome and that the defendant would be
entitled to appropriate relief. 36
The Swain burden has proved insurmountable;37 no defendant
has been able to comply. Nevertheless, Swain remains the rule. 38
34. Id.
35. Id. at 223-34. But see United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1971). In Pearson, the court said that it did "not read Swain as meaning that the at
tack on the Government's use of its challenges must fail if the impermissible use is
not exercised one hundred percent of the time." Id. at 1217. "The occasional service
of a black as a petit juror ... does not negate purposeful and systematic exclusion
over an extended period of time." State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164 n.1
(La. 1979).
36. 380 U.S. at 224. The Court recognized that the peremptory system was not
intended to "facilitate or justify" the use of challenges to deny blacks the "same
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice [as] ... the white
population." Id.
37. See Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977). The author states: "[N]o defendant has
yet been successful in proving to the court's satisfaction an invidious discrimination
by the use of the peremptory challenge against blacks over a period of time." Id. at
24. But see United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974), in which
the court granted the defendant a new trial "in the interest of justice" after the gov
ernment had peremptorily challenged six black jurors. Id. at 1250. See also United
States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the court ventured that the
Swain burden, although never met, is not "insurmountable." Id. at 1218.
In Swain, evidence that no black had served on a jury in the Alabama county in
question in at least 15 years, if ever, was deemed insufficient evidence of systematic
exclusion, and the prosecutor's actions were held not to be in error. 380 U.S. at
225-26.
38. Although the federal and state courts have consistently followed Swain, the
decision has not been without serious detractors. Commentators have assailed its ef
fect upon jury composition and decisionmaking. See Brown, McGuire, & Winters,
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional
Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Comment, A Case Study of the Per
emptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike At Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory
Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict
with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977); Comment, Swain
v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury,
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Federal and state courts faced with the task of evaluating
prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges consistently rely on
the Court's standard of proof as controlling, and the Supreme
Court has refused recent requests to reconsider the issue. 39
Defendants, however, have not been totally without remedy.
Alternative methods of challenging a prosecutor's abusive exercise
of peremptory challenges have emerged. Recently, in a series of
decisions, judges have been sympathetic to defendants' pleas of
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors.
Defendants have alleged and proved violations of state constitu
tional provisions protecting the right to trial by a jury representa
tive of a cross section of the community4° and the right to equal
protection and human dignity.41 The approaches adopted by the
highest state courts of California,42 Massachusetts,43 and Louisi
ana44 are important both for their points of departure from the
Swain approach and for their attempts to justifY their decisions
within the framework of the United States Constitution and recent
Supreme Court holdings. 45
V.

THE WHEELER ALTERNATIVE

In 1978, two black defendants in California successfully chal
lenged the validity of guilty verdicts reached by an all-white jury
that had been secured through the purposeful use of peremptory

52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Note, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv.
103 (1965); Note, The jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 1417 (1969); Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of
Prospective jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, People v.
Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEW ENG. L. REv. 370
(1978); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit
juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Note, Fair jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J.
322 (1965); 41 ALB. L. REV. 623 (1977).
39. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in recent cases which have raised
the issue. State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118
(1979); Commonwealth V. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State V. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 262 A.2d 868, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 949 (1970).
40. See text accompanying notes 51, 62 & 63 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 107 & 110 infra.
42. People V. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
43. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
44. State V. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State V. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361
(La. 1978) (concurring opinion); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978) (concur
ring opinion).
45. See note 76 infra for a discussion of the Supreme Court cases.
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challenges by the prosecution to eliminate all potential black ju
rors.46 In People v. Wheeler,47 the California Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution48 and
article I, section 16 of the California Constitution49 independently
and equally guaranteed the "right to trial by a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community."5o When the prose
cution uses peremptory challenges to exclude individuals from a
particular jury panel solely on the basis of group affiliation, and
bias presumed to emanate from this affiliation, the California con
stitutional guarantee, at least, is offended. 51 Any jury so impan
elled, or any verdict reached by such a panel, cannot stand. 52
The Wheeler court set forth a method of evaluating
prosecutorial action in light of a defendant's suspicion, in a particu
lar case, of abuse. 53 In accord with Swain, an initial presumption of
46. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 283, 583 P.2d 748, 766, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 907 (1978).
47. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
48. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[Tlhe
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to trial by an impartial jury was held applicable to
the states in 1968. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
49. Article I, § 16 of the California Constitution provides: "Trial by jury is an
inviolate right and shall be secured to all ...." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
SO. 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The represen
tative cross section requirement was first applied by the courts in cases involving the
systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries. See, e.g., Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The courts subsequently recognized other classes as worthy
of protection: Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (women); Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Chicanos); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946)
(wage earners). In 1970, the Supreme Court determined the right to a representative
jury to be a component of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
51. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The
California Supreme Court acknowledged that "Swain provides less protection to
California residents than the rule" adopted in Wheeler. Id. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. The court cited two major difficulties with Swain: First, the
defendant is required to show systematic exclusion over time so that an individual
defendant is afforded no protection; and second, the necessary data and records
needed to establish the proper record of systematic exclusion are essentially
unobtainable. Id. at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
52. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. See text accompanying
note 74 infra.
53. Prior to setting forth its method of evaluating prosecutorial exercise of per
emptory challenges, the Wheeler court rejected proposed methods based upon statis
tical analysis of the voir dire. The approaches urged by the defendants and an
amicus curiae would calculate the probability that the prosecutor intentionally exer
cised his peremptories to eliminate a particular group from the jury for discrimina
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prosecutorial propriety in the exercise of peremptory challenges ex
ists. 54 At this point the approaches diverge. While Swain asserted
that the presumption could be rebutted only by evidence of sys
tematic exclusion over an extended period of time,55 the court in
Wheeler declared that the presumption could be rebutted within
the framework of a single case. 58
The Wheeler court set forth a two-part test for defendants to
apply in rebutting the presumption that the prosecutor exercised
his peremptory challenges in a proper manner. The defendant
must establish the two elements of this test to the satisfaction of
the trial judge, by "as complete a record of the circumstances as is
feasible. . . . "57 First, the defendant must show exclusion of mem
bers of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representa
tive cross-section rule. 58 Second, the defendant must demonstrate
that there is a "strong likelihood" that the individuals were ex
cluded on the basis of that group membership, rather than on the
basis of a specific, individual bias. 59 Once a defendant makes out a
prima facie case of constitutionally impermissible action, the bur
den shifts to the prosecutor to justify his exercise of peremptory
challenges on specific bias grounds.
The Wheeler court explained both the scope of the representa
tive cross-section rule and the distinction between group and spe
cific bias. The court viewed the representative cross-section re
quirement as an important prerequisite to obtaining an impartial
jury.60 The interaction of diverse beliefs and inherent biases indi
tory reasons. The Wheeler court noted that statistical theories of evaluating the
venire have been adyocated by scholars and accepted by courts, but expressed con
cern that statistics c~uld properly be utilized at the challenge stage ~f the proceed
ings. 22 Cal. 3d at 278-80, 583 P.2d at 763-64, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05. The court
chose instead to follow what it termed "more traditional procedures." See text ac
companying notes 55-60 & 72-74 infra, for a discussion of the Wheeler approach.
54. 22 Cal. 3d at 278, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904. The Wheeler court
set forth three reasons for the presumption of prosecutorial propriety in the exercise
of peremptory challenges: The presumption is consistent with the legislative intent
underlying peremptories; it encourages the use of peremptories in appropriate cases;
and it accords respect for attorneys as officers of the court. ld. at 278, 583 P.2d at
762-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
55. See notes 32 & 33 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Swain burden.
56. 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
57. ld. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
58. ld.
59. ld.
60. ld. at 270, 583 P.2d at 757, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
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vidual jurors necessarily bring with them to the decisionmaking
process was cited as critical to achieving an impartial jury.61
[I]n our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to
diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion,
ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, eco
nomic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; . . .
it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, precon
ceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life ex
periences in such groups; [therefore] . . . the only practical way
to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representa
tion of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective
biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will
tend to cancel each other out. 62

When a juror is peremptorily challenged on the basis of group
membership, and beliefs commonly associated with that member
ship, "such interaction [of diverse beliefs and values] becomes im
possible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or uncon
scious prejudices of the majority. "63
The Wheeler court was vague as to what constituted a "cog
nizable group," stating only that blacks constituted such a group. 64
The California Supreme Court, however, has since had occasion to
explore the meaning of "cognizable groups." In Rubio v. Superior
Court of San Joaquin County,65 a defendant challenged the exclu
sion of resident aliens from California's jury pools. The court set
forth two requirements that must be met before a group will be
considered cognizable within the meaning of the representative
cross-section rule. 66 "First, its members must share a common
perspective arising from their life experience in the group . . .
[including] a common social or psychological outlook on human
events. "67 Second, no other members of the community can be ca
pable of adequately representing that common perspective so ex
61.

Id. at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
62. [d. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v.
Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 617, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979),
pointed out that "[i)t is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consis
tently vote as a class in order to conclude ... that its exclusion deprives the jury of a
perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case
...." Id. at 617-18, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
63. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
64. Id. at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
65. 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
66. Id. at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
67. Id.
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cluded from the jury.68 When these two requirements are met,
then exclusion of group members effectively impedes the desired
mixture of community attitudes and beliefs that is the essence of
the representative cross-section rule. 69
To be considered impermissible, the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges of members of a cognizable group must be based solely
on the fact of group membership. The Wheeler court termed this
"group bias. "70 The elimination of an individual who is a member
of a cognizable group, however, would be permissible if based
upon "specific bias." A specific bias is "a bias relating to the partic
ular case on trial or the parties or witnesses thereto."71
Under the Wheeler rationale, once a prima facie case of exclu
sion is established, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to justifY his

68. [d.
69. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. This definition of
cognizable groups is applicable only in the California state court system. Other ap
proaches to the meaning of the term are likely. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954), the United States Supreme Court stated that, in the past, race and color have
been readily identifiable characteristics of groups needing the Court's protection.
But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other
differences from the community norm may define other groups which need
the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a
question of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and
it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.
Id. at 478. Thus, in Hernandez, the Supreme Court held that systematic exclusion of
Mexican-Americans from service on grand and petit juries was a denial of equal pro
tection to a defendant of Mexican descent. [d. at 482.
In Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), the Court said that "eco
nomic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community"
could not be excluded from jury service. Id. at 220. The Thiel court concluded that a
system which resulted in exclusion of most wage earners from jury service was im
permissible.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has chosen to define such groups in
relation to the equal rights amendment adopted by the state legislature in 1976.
Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 628, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516. Thus,
peremptory challenges based solely upon "sex, race, color, creed, or national origin"
would be impermissible. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I. This is a broader definition than
the one set forth by the California court in Rubio v. Superior Court of San Joaquin
County, 24 Cal. 3d at 93, 593 P.2d at 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 734. In Rubio, exclusion
of resident aliens from California's jury selection pools was upheld on the ground
that, although the members might share common experiences, those experiences
could be vicariously represented by other individuals eligible for jury service. Id.-at
100, 593 P.2d at 599, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Under the Massachusetts approach, exclu
sion on the basis of national origin would be unconstitutional.
70. 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
71. [d.
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use of peremptories by showing that they were used in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. The prosecutor must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the judge 72 that the peremptories were exercised
against members of a cognizable group on the basis of specific
bias. 73 At this point, if the prosecutor is unable to make a showing
of permissible use of the peremptory challenges, the jury already
selected is dismissed, the entire jury pool is quashed, and jury se
lection must begin anew. 74
The uniqueness of the Wheeler approach stems from the ex
tension of the representative cross-section requirement, previously
applied only to the jury venire, to the composition of the jury
panel itself. The Wheeler court based its extension of the rule to
the jury panel upon a series of California7S and United States Su
preme Court'6 decisions which did not expressly apply the rule be
yond the jury selection stage.
The extension of the right to a representative cross section to
the composition of the actual jury panel is not illogical. The same
concerns that give rise to the necessity for a variety of attitudes
and beliefs on the jury venire are present in the final stage of se
lection of an impartial jury, the impanelling of the actual jury. 77
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet chosen to extend the
representative cross-section requirement to petit jury composition.
In Taylor v. Louisiana,78 the Supreme Court, in the course of
identifying and applying the representative cross-section rule to the
72. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The showing of per
missible use of the peremptory challenge against a particular juror need not meet the
level of justification necessary to support a challenge for cause. Id.
73. Id.
74. [d. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
75. [d. at 270-72,583 P.2d at 757-58, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900. The court dis
cusses People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1945), in detail. In White, the
California Supreme Court expressly recognized the requirement of "an impartial jury
drawn from a cross-section of the entire community" as an essential component of
the right to trial by an impartial jury. [d. at 754, 278 P.2d at 17.
76. 22 Cal. 3d at 266-70,583 P.2d at 754-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-98. The court
traced a series of United States Supreme Court decisions from Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128 (1940) (systematic exclusion of blacks from grand jury service) to Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (systematic exclusion of women from jury service).
The Wheeler court relied upon the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis that a petit
jury should embody a representative cross section of the community, as proof of the
importance of the representative cross-section rule in protecting the right to trial by
impartial jury. 22 Cal. 3d at 270, 583 P.2d at 757, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
77. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.
3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
78. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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selection of the venire, specifically rejected any "requirement that
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect
the various distinctive groups in the population. "79 The Wheeler
court recognized the impracticability of such a mirror-image re
quirement but refused to allow the final stage in the jury selection
process, the challenges, to escape all representative require
ments. 80 It is this extension of the requirement that defendants in
other state courts may seize upon in attempting to challenge
prosecutorial abuse of challenges.
VI.

POST-WHEELER: THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ApPROACH

Challenging prosecutorial action by asserting a denial of a state
constitutional right is a narrow approach to the problem. This
method of attack cannot be used unless the state constitution pro
vides appropriate protection. To date, the highest courts 81 of

79. [d. at 538. Later, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court
again noted that "the fact that a particular jury ... does not statistically reflect the ra
cial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimi
nation forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause." [d. at 239. Congress expressly
rejected the mirror-image rule. Discussing the Jury Selection and Service Act of
1968,28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, 1871 (1976), which was passed to ensure that potential
jurors will be selected randomly from a representative cross section of the commu
nity, the House report states that the Act "does not require that at any stage beyond
the initial source list the selection process shall produce groups that accurately mir
ror community makeup." H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1792,1794.
Further, the report notes that the Act "leaves undisturbed the right of a litigant
to exercise his peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely subjective rea
sons." [d. at 1795 (emphasis added).
80. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
81. Although the New York Court of Appeals has not decided the issue, one
New York supreme court has considered whether the New York Constitution affords
defendants the same protections that the California and Massachusetts courts delin
eate in Wheeler and Soares. In People V. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987
(Sup. Ct. 1979), a New York supreme court held that the use of peremptory chal
lenges to exclude jurors "solely by reason of their sex, race, color, creed, or national
origin," where that affiliation is the same as that of the defendant, is a deprivation of
the right to trial by a jury of peers guaranteed by art. 1, § 1 of the New York Consti
tution. [d. at 277, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 989. The court went on to find that there had been
no violation of the rights of two Jewish defendants when a prosecutor used five of
his six peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury individuals with surnames
that the defendants claimed indicated affiliation with the Jewish faith. A subsequent
judicial inquiry determined that in fact four of the five were Jewish. [d. at 277, 420
N.Y.S.2d at 990.
For an explanation of the California court's approach in Wheeler, see text accom
panying notes 49-54,56-59 & 72-74 supra.
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California,82 Massachusetts,83 Louisiana,84 and Delaware85 have
shown at least some interest in affording defendants protection be
yond Swain's limits. Other state courts, however, continue to ad
here to Swain; the rights of defendants in these states to a fair trial
unhampered by prosecutorial discrimination in the use of
peremptories remains essentially unprotected. 86
A.

Massachusetts: Adopting the Wheeler Approach

Commonwealth v. Soares 87 was the first post-Wheeler case
to adopt the Wheeler approach. The Massachusetts Supreme Judi
cial Court found that the state constitutional guarantee of a fair trial
by an impartial jury, embodied in article XII of the Declaration of
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution,88 was violated by the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove twelve of the
thirteen blacks on the venire. 89 Like the California Supreme Court
82. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. See notes 47-59 &
70-74 supra and accompanying text.
83. Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
84. State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979); State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361
(La. 1978); State v. Kelly, 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978).
85. Saunders v. State, 401 A.2d 629 (Del. 1979). The Delaware Supreme Court
discussed the Wheeler mode of inquiry into the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal
lenges, but rejected its application where only one black was called to the jury box
and peremptorily challenged. The court stated that there was no indication of impro
priety in this single instance. Id. at 632. The mention of Wheeler, however, may indi
cate a willingness to follow its standard in future cases in the Delaware courts where
a pattern cof abuse arises within a single jury selection proceeding.
86. See, e.g., Watts v. State, 53 Ala. App. 518, 521, 301 So. 2d 280, 283 (Crim.
App. 1974); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Jones v.
State, 243 Ga. 820, 822, 256 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1979); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410,
416, 591 P.2d 166, 172 (1979); People v. Redwine, 50 Mich. App. 593, 596, 213
N.W.2d 841, 843 (1973); State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Mo. 1975); State v.
Hatten, 561 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 483,
262 A.2d 868, 871 (1970); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289,296,336 A.2d 290,
294 (1975); Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); State v.
Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 116, 549 P.2d 712, 714 (1976); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1,
8,286 N.w.2d 607, 609 (1979).
87. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 593, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
In People v. Allen, 23 Cal. 3d 286, 590 P.2d 30, 152 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1979), the
California Supreme Court followed the approach it had set forth in Wheeler. Id. at
289, 590 P.2d at 31, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
88. Article XII of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution
provides for trial "by the judgment of [the defendant's] ... peers." MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. XII.
89. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626-27,387 N.E.2d at 515-16. Although one black ju
ror remained on the jury panel that tried and convicted the defendants in Soares, the
court stated that this did not affect the holding:
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in Wheeler, the court in Soares reviewed the representative cross
section rule as applied by Massachusetts 90 and the United States
Supreme Court91 and concluded that "the right to be tried by a
jury drawn fairly from a representative cross-section of the commu
nitY is critical. "92 The exclusion of cognizable groups from a jury
panel "deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be pre
sented. "93 Thus, the Massachusetts court stated that peremptories
may be used only to challenge "prospective jurors whose unique
relationship to the particular case raises the spectre of individual
· "94
b las.
The approach adopted by the Soares court for evaluating the
actions of a prosecutor in a given case clearly is modeled after
Wheeler. 95 The defendant must make a prima facie showing that
the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude individu
als from the jury solely on the basis of group bias. The prosecutor
must then come forward and justify the challenges on the basis of
specific bias. 96 The Soares court specifically rejected the Swain ap
proach, noting that the defendants were not predicating their
claims of error upon a violation of the fourteenth amendment guar
antee of equal protection and would have been unsuccessful before
the court had they done so. The defendants would have had insuf
ficient evidence of past practices to meet the extensive burden
imposed by Swain. 97
One need not eliminate 100% of minority jurors to achieve an impermissible
purpose. If the minority's representation is reduced to 'impotence,' as for ex
ample, by the challenge of a disproportionate number of group members,
and the failure to challenge only a minority member who can reasonably be
relied on as 'safe,' the majority identified biases are likely to meet little re
sistance, and the representative cross-section requirement is not fulfilled.
[d. at 627 n.32, 387 N.E.2d at 516 n.32. Cf. State v. Bias, 354 So. 2d 1330, 1331 (La.
1978) (systematic exclusion can still be shown when token blacks are included over a
period of time on juries).
90. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 614, 387 N.E.2d at 510-11.
91. [d. at 615-18, 387 N.E.2d at 511-12.
92. [d. at 616, 387 N.E.2d at 511.
93. [d. at 617-18, 387 N.E.2d at 512.
94. [d. at 623,387 N.E.2d at 514.
95. [d. at 629, 387 N.E.2d at 517. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text
for the Wheeler test.
96. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 631-32, 387 N.E.2d at 517-18. See notes 72-74 supra
and accompanying text for the remedy the Wheeler court applied once a prima facie
case of discrimination had been established and not rebutted by the prosecutor.
97. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 611 n.l0, 387 N.E.2d at 509 n.lO. The court re
marked that the defendants "declined to take up the Sisyphean burdens imposed on
persons asserting a violation of equal protection under Swain." Id.
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The Soares court's comments about the unavailability of an
equal protection claim, combined with the Wheeler court's similar
pessimism, raises serious questions about the status of an equal
protection argument. At least one state supreme court, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, has begun to consider the equal protec
tion guarantee of its constitution as affording possible protection
and may serve as a guide to defendants in other states.
B.

Louisiana-The Possibility of Utilizing Equal Protection

While a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to
depart fully from the Swain standard, a series of recent concurring
opinions has suggested a possible mode of departure. In State v.
Brown,98 the court acknowledged the persistent plea of colleagues
to adopt a new approach, but a majority of the court still refused to
do SO.99 Due to the present concern with developing alternatives
to Swain, and the possibility that the proffered alternative may
soon be followed by courts dissatisfied with Swain, the analysis
Brown refers to is worth evaluating. Specifically, the concurring
opinions in State v. Eames 100 and State v. Kelly101 will be ex
plored.
In State v. Kelly, 102 the defendant raised the issue of prejudi
cial error due to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
against ten black jurors, thereby achieving an all-white jury. loa The
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that
his right to an impartial jury representing a cross section of the
community was infringed. 104 Instead, the court followed Swain,
and finding no evidence of systematic exclusion over time, dis
missed the defendant's claim of error as without merit. 105
98. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
99. Id. at 754 n.4. Following Brown, the Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated
its adherence to the principles articulated in Swain. See State v. Albert, 381 So. 2d
424 (La. 1980); State v. Allen, 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980). Judge Dennis concurred in
both cases, on the ground that prosecutorial discrimination could occur in a single
case. State v. Albert, 381 So. 2d at 432; State v. Allen, 380 So. 2d at 32.
100. 365 So. 2d 1361 (La. 1978).
101. 362 So. 2d 1071 (La. 1978).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1076.
104. Id. at 1077. Subsequently, defendants successfully relied upon this ap
proach in California and Massachusetts. The highest courts of both states found
violations of the defendant's state constitutional right to a jury composed of a repre
sentative cross section of the community. See notes 47-52 & 87-89 supra and ac
companying text for a discussion of the approach.
105. 362 So. 2d at 1077.
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Judge Dennis concurred in the Kelly result but felt that the
defendant might have been successful had he made a timely objec
tion at trial to the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremp
tories. 10S Judge Dennis suggested that such action on the part of
the prosecutor was in violation of article I, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution. 107 Subsequently, in State v. Eames, 108 the
defendant made timely objections to the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptories to exclude all but one of the black veniremen. 109
Judge Dennis, joined by two of his colleagues, renewed his
discussion of the rights he felt were violated when the prosecutor
used his peremptories in such a manner.
The Eames concurrence asserted that the Louisiana Constitu
tion, in guaranteeing the right to equal protection and human dig
nity, absolutely forbids prosecutorial action that discriminates
against a person on the basis of race or religion. 110 This absolute
prohibition under the Louisiana Constitution contrasts sharply with
the Swain analysis of the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution, which would find no violation of equal protec
tion by the exercise of peremptories in a single case to exclude
members of a racial group.ll1 The concurring judges in Eames ar
gued that the presumption of prosecutorial propriety set forth in
Swain is unjustified if there is "substantial evidence [of] ... exclu
sion of jurors because of race. "112 Thus, once it is shown that the
prosecution has exercised "a disproportionate number of challenges
against members of one race[,] . . . a prima facie case of discrimi
nation because of race has been established. . . . "113 At this point,
as in the Wheeler and Soares analysis,114 the burden shifts to
the prosecution to show that the challenges were exercised on the
basis of individual characteristics apart from the group affiliation. lls

106. Id. at 1082.
107. Id. Article I, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution sets forth the right to indi
vidual human dignity: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
or affiliations. . . ." LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. See also Hargrave, The Declaration of
Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,35 LA. L. REV. 1,8 (1974).
108. 365 So. 2d at 1361.
109. Id. at 1365.
1l0. Id. at 1368-69.
111. See notes 33 & 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
112. 365 So. 2d at 1369.
113. Id. at 1370. See also text accompanying notes 132-35 infra.
114. See notes 72, 73 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
115. 365 So. 2d at 1370.
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The essential distinction between the Louisiana standard advo
cated by Judge Dennis and that adopted in Massachusetts and
California is in the scope of the protection afforded the defendant.
The Wheeler and Soares courts expressed concern about, and fash
ioned a remedy to eliminate, the use of peremptory challenges by
prosecutors on the basis of any cognizable group membership. The
method advocated in the Eames concurrence extends only to the
use of peremptories by prosecutors to eliminate members of racial
groups from the jury.1 16 Nevertheless, the approach articulated in
Kelly and Eames provides an important starting point for defend
ants interested in attacking prosecutorial abuse of peremptories.
Although the right to equal protection discussed in these cases ap
pears to extend "beyond the decisional law construing the Four
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"117 it serves
to highlight the importance of the right to equal protection and the
need for federal protection of that right in the context of the jury
challenge stage of trial proceedings.

VII.

BEYOND STATE CONSTITUTIONS-

FASHIONING A FEDERAL REMEDY

Individual defendants in California, Louisiana, and Massa
chusetts may have an available state-created remedy for
prosecutorial misuse of peremptory challenges; however, the broad
prospect of continued abuse of peremptory challenges invites spec
ulation as to how defendants may be provided with a constitutional
avenue of protection that will surmount the obstacles created by
Swain. In the Eames concurrence, Judge Dennis· suggests an
alternative. U8 He argues that the Swain standard should become
inapplicable when the prosecutor admits to using his peremptory
challenges to exclude members of a racial or ethnic group without
a legitimate specific bias justification. 119 Once the prosecutor
makes this admission, a prima facie case of violation of equal pro
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1369.
118. Id. at 1372.
119. Id. But see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). The Louisiana
Supreme Court found Swain applicable and its burden met where a single prosecu
tor testified at an evidentiary hearing that he had consistently excluded blacks from
juries by the use of peremptory challenges "solely on the basis of race and without
examination as to the individual's particular qualifications or predilections." Id. at
1164. Similarly, in United States v. Danzey, 476 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the
district court stated that the prosecutor's motive is irrelevant unless there is a show
ing of systematic exclusion over time. Id. at 1067.

1980]

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

241

tection under the fourteenth amendment is established. 120 Addi
tionally, the prosecutor's admission need not be a bold statement
of purpose. When the prosecutor fails to provide a good faith justi
fication for the challenged exercise of his peremptories against
members of a racial group, an admission may be found. 121 The
burden would then shift to the government to show that the exer
cise of each peremptory challenge by the prosecutor was based
upon permissible specific bias grounds.
It is rare, however, that a prosecutor will be called upon to
admit in a judicial proceeding that his exercise of peremptory chal
lenges against potential jurors was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Rather, the prosecutor normally exercises his peremp
tories without comment as to the basis for the exclusion and with
out subsequent judicial inquiry. 122 The prosecutor's use of peremp
tory challenges should be presumed to be proper. 123 Nevertheless,
when a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges results in
the exclusion of a disproportionate number of individuals of a
single discrete group affiliation from service on a particular jury, a
defendant may wish to challenge the prosecutor's actions as dis
criminatory. Swain and its progeny indicate that a defendant must
prove systematic exclusion of the group by prosecutors in the par
ticular trial court system, over an extended period of time, in order
to prevai1. 124 An alternative analysis, however, seems to be sug
gested by the United States Supreme Court's discussions of invidi
ous discrimination violative of the equal protection components of
the fourteenth and fifth amendments.
In Washington v. Davis, 125 the United States Supreme Court
identified the central purpose of the equal protection clause as "the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race. "126 When a defenda •.t believes that the prosecutor in his case

120. 365 So. 2d at 1372. At least one federal court has expressed concern that if
a prosecutor were required to testify as to his motive for exercising his peremptories
in a particular case against individuals of a particular racial group, the prosecutor
might then be criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1976) for excluding a quali
fied citizen from jury service on account of race. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d
1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971).
121. 365 So. 2d at 1372.
122. See note 1 supra for a discussion of the characteristics of peremptory chal
lenges, as well as a discussion of chailenges for cause.
123. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
125. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
126. ld. at 239.
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has exercised peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner,
thereby excluding members of a particular racial group, the equal
protection clause, consonant with its essential purpose, ought to be
available to vindicate the defendant's rights. The Supreme Court
has stated that "the fact that a particular jury ... does not statisti
cally reflect the racial composition of the community does not in it
self make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the [Equal
Protection] Clause. "127 Rather, the Court has required a showing
of purposeful discrimination. 128
Systematic exclusion should be but one method of proving
purposeful discrimination. Additionally, when a defendant proves
that the prosecutor's actions had a disproportionate impact on jury
composition, and he can point to additional factors concerning the
selection of the jury that give rise to an inference of intentional dis
crimination, a violation of the equal protection clause should be es
tablished. In Davis, the Court pointed out that "an invidious dis
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts"129 including the fact that the official act had a dis
proportionate impact on one race. 130 The Davis Court discussed
juror selection cases at length131 and acknowledged that discrimi
natory impact "may, for all practical purposes demonstrate uncon
stitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is
very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. "132 Although the
Court was relying on cases concerning the exclusion of jurors from
grand and petit juries by operation of jury selection systems, it is
127. [d. See also text accompanying notes 79 & 80 supra.
128. [d. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action .... But such cases are rare. Absent [such] a pattern, ... impact alone
is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence." [d. at 266. In a
footnote, the Court noted that a "single invidiously discriminatory act ... would not
necessarily be immunized [from a challenge of discrimination] by the absence of
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions." [d. at n.14.
129. 426 U.S. at 242.
130. [d.
131. The Court's discussion of the jury selection cases begins with Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and includes Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625 (1972), Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S.
320 (1970), Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S.
584 (1958), Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953), Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950), Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947), Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398
(1945), and Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942). Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
239-42.
132. 426 U.S. at 242.
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arguable that the same rationale should apply to the exclusion of
jurors from the petit jury by the prosecutor's exercise of peremp
tory challenges. Thus, when the prosecutor's exercise of his
peremptories results in the exclusion of all or nearly all individuals
of a particular racial or ethnic group from the jury panel and the
discriminatory impact is very difficult to explain on grounds
unrelated to the discrete group affiliation, an unconstitutional exer
cise of the challenges might be found.
In its discussion of the jury selection cases, the Davis Court
also indicated that a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose
might be proven by the absence, or the severely disproportionate
exclusion, of blacks from a particular jury,133 combined with
nonneutral selection criteria or procedures. 134 One such nonneutral
factor, a defendant might argue, is the use of peremptory chal
lenges to exclude all, or nearly all, individuals of a particular dis
crete group affiliation on general, rather than specific, bias
grounds. The number of peremptory challenges the prosecutor
used, the group affiliations of those excused, the proportionate ex
ercise of challenges against group and nongroup members, the
composition of the resultant panel, as well as the proportionate
representation of group and nongroup members in the community
at large might be relevant factors demonstrating the nonneutral
character of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a
particular case.
Once a defendant established a prima facie case of discrimina
tory purpose, the burden of proof would shift to the prosecutor to
rebut the presumption of discriminatory action. The Supreme
Court has suggested that the government might refute a presump
tion of discrimination "by showing that permissible racially neutral
selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochro
matic result. "135 The prosecutor might meet this burden by coming
forward and identifying the specific bias reasons for excluding each
of the group members, thereby demonstrating that it was not the
common group affiliation that led to the exclusions and that the re
sulting jury panel was not purposefully disproportionate in its com
position. If the prosecutor is unwilling or unable to identify specific
133.
134.

[d. at 241.
[d. For example, the Court pointed out that a prima facie case of discrimi

natory purpose was presented when the jury commissioners were not informed of el
igible black jurors in Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942), and blacks were absent from
the particular jury. 426 U.S. at 241.
135. 426 U.S. at 241.
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bias reasons for the exclusion of each of the individuals
peremptorily challenged, then a violation of the equal protection
clause may be established. Since the jury panel so selected would
be the result of invidious discrimination by the prosecutor, it
would appear proper to follow the suggestion of People v.
Wheeler 136 by beginning jury selection again.137
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Com
monwealth v. Soares 138 contains sufficient information about the
composition of the jury venire, the exercise of peremptory chal
lenges by the prosecutor, and the resulting jury paneP39 to enable
application of the equal protection analysis just suggested. In
Soares two black defendants were charged with the murder of a
white victim. The jury that tried and convicted the defendants in
cluded only one black member. 140 The prosecutor had exercised
forty-four peremptory challenges, excluding twelve of the thirteen
blacks on the venire and thirty-two of the ninety-four whites on the
venire. 141 The court pointed out that "Through his use of these
[peremptory] challenges, ... [the prosecutor] excluded ninety-two
percent of the available black jurors, and only thirty-four per cent
of the available white jurors. "142 The defendants in Soares might
have argued that the prosecutor had used his peremptory chal
lenges in order to purposefully exclude blacks from the jury. Fur
ther, the combination of the exclusion of almost all blacks from the
jury and the use of the peremptory challenges in a nonneutral
manner would constitute a violation of the equal protection clause.
Once the defendants had set forth a prima facie case of discrimina
tory action by the prosecutor, the government would have the bur
den of proving that the prosecutor's exercise of his peremptories
was based on permissible neutral criteria, rather than on the fact of
group affiliation. 143
The utility of such an equal protection approach is unclear at
present. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor state su
preme courts have used this mode of analysis in determining the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 258, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
See text accompanying note 74 supra.
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 593, 387 N.E.2d at 499.
See generally text accompanying notes 87-97 supra.
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 607-08, 387 N .E.2d at 508. See also note 89 supra.
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 608, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
ld.
ld. at 630,387 N.E.2d at 517.
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constitutionality of a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal
lenges. Nonetheless, this alternative may prove valuable in the fu
ture.
Another alternative for defendants is to continue to press for a
reevaluation of the representative cross-section rule and its applica
bility to the actual jury panel. Although it is clear that the Court
in Taylor rejected the mirror-image concept of petit jury composi
tion,144 the representative cross-section rule still may extend to the
jury panel. The Supreme Court has never indicated that Duncan v.
Louisiana 145 and Taylor cannot be so extended. If more state
courts recognize the importance of the representative cross-section
rule to jury composition at the final stage of jury selection, the Su
preme Court might be willing to reevaluate and expand its holding
in Taylor.
In addition to suggesting possible constitutional routes of chal
lenge for defendants, it is important to recognize that legislative
change may in fact be the only way to protect defendants
nationwide from prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges.
Two alternatives are worthy of consideration.
Some commentators have argued that the peremptory chal
lenge should be abolished. 146 It is felt that the potential and actual
discriminatory application and abuse is too great to permit the con
tinued exercise of peremptories. This belief is supported by the
current failure of the courts to provide sufficient protection for de
fendants in the criminal process from prosecutorial manipulation of
jury panels. The desire and necessity for a fair trial by an impartial
jury still could be insured through the random selection of the jury
venire and the continued use of statutory excuses and challenges
for cause. Nevertheless, given the underlying purposes of the per
emptory challenge,147 and its continued approval by the courts, 148
abolition seems unlikely at present.
A second legislative solution would be to eliminate the statu
tory grant of peremptory challenges to the prosecution while re
taining the right for the defense. 149 Considering the historical de
144. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
145. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
146. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 167-68. Brown, McGuire, & Winters, supra
note 38, at 234-35.
147. See notes 3 & 4 supra and accompanying text for Blackstone's explanation
of the underlying purposes.
148. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
149. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 167.
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velopment of peremptory challenges,150 this approach may seem
attractive. The prosecution was without the right during much of
the time that our common law and statutory law were developing.
The rationale for extending the right to the prosecution, to allow
the elimination of potential jurors unfairly biased against acquittal,
while valid, may not stand up to the increasing need for protection
of the defendant's constitutionally protected right to a fair trial by
an impartial jury.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The peremptory challenge has been recognized as an essential
mechanism for assuring an impartial jury in a particular trial. The
challenges also have been the subject of abuse by prosecutors who
exercise their peremptories to exclude members of discrete groups
from petit juries solely on the basis of that membership. This dis
criminatory use of peremptory challenges may produce a jury
biased in favor of conviction. The prosecutor's actions arguably im
pinge on the defendant's rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury
and to equal protection under the laws. Yet the future of the per
emptory challenge and of the protection of the criminal defendant's
rights remains uncertain.
In Swain, the United States Supreme Court established the
presumption that prosecutors' peremptory challenges were exer
cised fairly so as to secure an impartial jury. To overcome this pre
sumption, defendants are faced with an insurmountable burden of
proof: defendants must show -extensive, systematic, and complete
exclusion of a particular racial or ethnic group from juries over an
extended period of time. Inroads are being made into the Swain
barrier, as evidenced by the opinions of a few state courts, yet the
United States Supreme Court has essentially remained silent on
this issue for fifteen years. It is unknown at present whether the
United States Supreme Court or additional state courts will follow
the examples of Wheeler and Soares. These two cases prohibit per
emptory challenges on general bias grounds and place a limitation
on their use, thus ending prosecutors' exclusion of discrete groups
from particular jury panels in contravention of the right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Further, the suggestion of an equal pro
tection analysis has not been adopted by the courts in their evalua
tions of prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges.

150. See notes 9-24 supra and accompanying text.
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The potential for, and reality of, prosecutorial abuse of per
emptory challenges makes it essential that the courts reevaluate
their approaches to defendants' claims of prosecutorial abuse of
peremptory challenges. Defendants in criminal trials should be af
forded the protection effectively denied them under Swain.
Susan L. Larky

